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Abstract 
In this paper, we develop an empirical framework for detecting the existence and 
estimating the magnitude of the softness of a budget constraint. The defining feature of a 
soft budget constraint is a subordinate organization’s expectations of being bailed out by 
a superior organization in case of financial trouble. This implies that one has to link the 
organization’s expectations for being bailed out to its fiscal behavior in order to quantify 
the extent of the soft budget constraint. We postulate that expectations for bailouts are 
formed rationally and make use of an instrumental variable method to get consistent 
estimates of the parameters of interest. We argue that past own experience of being bailed 
out and bailouts of other subordinate organizations can be used to construct credible 
instruments for the formation of bailout expectations. We apply our empirical approach 
to a unique panel data set of 286 Swedish local governments where the central 
government provided a total of 1,697 bailouts between 1974 and 1992. Our results 
strongly suggest the existence of a soft budget constraint; a local government increases its 
level of debt by 6-10 percent if it expects to be bailed out with probability one as 
compared to when the likelihood is zero due to previous experience of being bailed out, 
while the effect on debt from bailouts of its geographical neighbors is roughly four times 
as large. 
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1. Introduction 
The concept “Soft Budget Constraint” (henceforth SBC) was first introduced by Kornai 
(1979, 1980) were it referred to a situation in which socialist firms were recurrently 
bailed out by state-agencies when revenues did not cover costs, but the concept is now 
being used in other branches of economics as well.
1 According to Kornai, Maskin, and 
Roland (2003), the SBC phenomena is characterized by a vertical relationship of 
superiority and subordination between two organizations where the subordinate 
organization faces a budget constraint, i.e., it must cover its expenditures out of its initial 
endowments and own revenues. The problem of the SBC is said to occur when the 
superior organization is ready to provide financial support to its subordinate in case of 
financial trouble. In other words, if a subordinate organization can expect to be rescued 
from trouble and those expectations in turn affect its behavior, then the budget constraint 
is soft. 
In this paper, we develop an empirical framework for detecting the existence and 
estimating the magnitude of the SBC. The approach is then applied to the relationship 
between the central and local governments in Sweden. The relationship between central 
and local governments is an attractive testing ground of the SBC since it has often been 
argued that if the central government is expected to provide bailouts to fiscally distressed 
sub-national governments, the incentives of sub-national governments to respect the 
fiscal discipline imposed by their budget constraints may be weakened. Swedish local 
governments were bailed out recurrently over the period 1974-1992, making it possible 
that they expected to be rescued from financial trouble, which, in turn, might have had 
deteriorating effects on their budget discipline. 
The SBC can be modeled formally as a simultaneous equation model, where one 
equation describes the behavior of the subordinate organization (e.g., a local government) 
and another equation describes the behavior of the superior organization (e.g., the central 
government). As is well-known, one needs exclusion restrictions i.e., certain variables 
need to be excluded from some equations (i.e., instrumental variables), to be able to 
                                                 
1 For example, SBCs have been used to analyze financial systems structure (Dewatripont and Maskin, 
1995) and federalism (Qian and Roland, 1998).   2
identify the parameters of such a model. Ideally, one would like to be able to identify all 
the parameters in both equations. However, this would require, for example, that we 
could specify all the relevant motives for a superior organization to provide bailouts to its 
subordinate organizations; a formidable challenge considering the plethora of possible 
motives identified in the SBC literature.
2 Our approach is instead to focus on the equation 
describing the subordinate organization fiscal behavior since it is the key in quantifying 
the degree of softness of the budget constraint, namely linking the subordinate’s fiscal 
behavior to its expectation of being rescued from financial straits. Nevertheless, the 
equation describing the bailout behavior of the superior organization will provide us with 
the necessary instruments for the formation of bailout expectations. In other words, we 
will use an instrumental variable (IV) approach where the fiscal behavior of a subordinate 
organization is the structural equation of interest, while the reduced form equation is a 
linear projection of realized bailouts on instruments. This estimating procedure also 
implies that expectations for bailouts are formed rationally.   
The key of the IV method is to find valid instruments. We argue that both past 
own experience of being bailed out and bailouts of other organizations in the same part of 
the economy can provide attractive instruments. The use of these instruments can also be 
motivated from theoretical models stressing the link between SBCs and dynamic 
commitment,
3 i.e., the superior organization would not wish to commit itself 
contractually to provide support; its incentive to bail the subordinate organization out 
arises only ex post. Interpreting the SBC problem as arising from the inability of the 
superior organization to make dynamic commitments suggests that one can use 
information about previous bailouts in constructing instruments since they should contain 
information about the superior organization’s capability of making such commitments. 
Put differently, previous bailouts provide the source of variation used to identify the 
effect of expectation of bailouts on the subordinate organization’s fiscal behavior. 
The main finding is that the SBC problem exists and that it is sizeable; the 
estimates of past own experience indicate that a local government facing a probability of 
                                                 
2 See Kornai et al. (2003) for a discussion of motives. 
3 See, for example, Dewatripont and Maskin (1995).  
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one of being bailed out increases its debt with approximately SEK 700-1,000 per capita 
as compared to if the probability is zero, which corresponds to 6-10 percent of average 
debt. However, the estimate of the effect on debt from bailouts of geographical neighbors 
is at least four times as large as the effect from past own experience. 
The outline of the paper is as follow. In the next section, we present the empirical 
approach for evaluating soft budget constraints, while section 3 discusses the details of 
the empirical application. Section 4 presents the empirical results and section 5 
summarizes and gives some concluding remarks. 
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2. Empirical framework 
In this section, we develop an empirical approach for evaluating soft budget constraints. 
In doing so, we have to consider the following issues: (i) the link between a subordinate 
organization’s expectations for bailouts and its fiscal behavior, (ii) the formation of a 
subordinate organization’s bailout expectations, (iii) the subordinate organization’s 
information set, and (iv) estimation. These issues will, in turn, be discussed in the next 
four sub-sections. 
 
2.1 Linking bailout expectations to fiscal behavior 
The major challenge of an empirical investigation of the SBC is to link the fiscal 
behavior of a subordinate organization to its expectation of being rescued from financial 
straits, since “[i]f a bailout is entirely unanticipated there is little point in ascribing the 
event to a SBC. We normally say that the syndrome is truly at work if organizations can 
expect to be rescued from trouble, and those expectations in turn affect their behavior” 
(Kornai et al., 2003). We therefore assume that a subordinate organization’s fiscal 
behavior can be expressed as 
(1)  it it
e
it it u X B S + + + = β α β0 , 
where  Sit is an observed measure of fiscal behavior, such as the level of debt, in 
subordinate organization i in time period t, 
e
it B  is expectations for bailouts as perceived 
by the subordinate , and Xit is a vector of observable variables that might be related to 
both Sit and 
e
it B .  
The parameter of interest is α, which measures the effect of expectations for 
bailouts on fiscal behavior, or the degree of softness of the budget constraint. Equation 
(1) should be interpreted in counterfactual terms, that is, for given Xit and uit, it gives the 
optimal fiscal response for any possible degree of expectations for bailouts faced by a 
subordinate organization.  Thus, the size of α will be the causal effect on Sit of going from 
a zero probability to a probability of one of being bailed out (i.e., α = E(S | B
e = 1, X) - 
E(S | B
e = 0, X). If we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no effect, the conclusion is that 
there does not seem to be a problem of SBC.   5
2.2 The formation of bailout expectations 
A problem with equation (1) is that we cannot directly estimate it since expectations are 
not directly observed. Thus, we need to model the formation of bailout expectations.
4 
Postulating rational expectations is the most common assumption in the literature 
estimating econometric models that includes an unobservable expectations variable. 
Thus, by assuming that expectations are formed rationally, i.e.,  
(2)  [ ] 1 | − = it it
e
it I B E B , 
where Iit-1 is the information available to organization i at time t-1, equation (1) becomes 
estimable.  
There are, basically, two methods of estimation for rational expectations models 
as described by equations (1) and (2): The “substitution method” (SM) or the “errors-in-
variables method” (EVM).
5  In the SM, the rationally expected variable, i.e.,  [] 1 | − it it I B E , 
is replaced by a forecast  it B ˆ , whereas the EVM is an Instrumental Variable (IV) method, 
which replaces the expectational variable by its observed realization, thereby creating a 
classical measurement error, i.e., Bit =
e
it B + vit, and where the factors included in the 
formation set Iit-1 provide the instrumental variables since they by assumption will be 
uncorrelated with the forecast error vit.  
In this paper, we will use the EVM to estimate the subordinate organization’s 
bailout expectations. The reason for this is that the EVM offers several attractive features 
compared to the SM in the present context of making causal inference of the relation 
between the expectation for bailouts and fiscal behavior, i.e. to consistently estimate the 
parameter α.  
First, by using EVM instead of SM, we do not have to model the motives for the 
superior organization to provide bailouts since EVM only requires a valid instrumental 
variable, whereas SM hinges on that we can correctly specify the conditional 
                                                 
4 An alternative to modeling the formation of bailout expectation is to elicit expectations through survey 
data. This is the method used by Anderson, Korsun, and Murell (2000). The potential problem with this 
method is whether subjective data reliably reflect respondents’ thinking and how to get comparable 
measures of expectations across respondents. See Dominitz and Manski (1997) for a discussion of the 
problem of using survey data to measure expectations. 
5 The literature on the estimation of rational expectations models is large. For example, see Lahiri (1993), 
McCallum (1976), Nelson (1975), Pagan (1984, 1986), Wallis (1980), and Wickens (1982).   6
expectation [] 1 | − it it I B E . Thus, the use of EVM greatly simplifies the investigation of the 
SBC problem considering the plethora of possible motives for the superior organization 
to provide support. Nevertheless, the robustness of the EVM to misspecifications comes 
at a cost. In the case we are interested in the reasons for the superior organization to 
provide bailouts we would have to model  [ ] 1 | − it it I B E  explicitly in order to make causal 
statements. 
A second attractive feature with EVM compared to SM is that we do not need to 
get the functional form of the first stage right, in the IV approach, to obtain consistent 
estimates of α in equation (1). Kelejian (1971) shows that it is unnecessary to obtain 
consistent estimates of the parameters of the reduced form equation in order to 
consistently estimate a structural equation. Thus, we can estimate a simple linear 
probability model in the first stage of the IV method. As will become clear below, the 
EVM approach allows us to circumvent the notorious difficult problem of estimating 
dynamic nonlinear panel data models with unobserved heterogeneity as discussed by 
Heckman (1981) and Honoré and Kyriazidou (2000) among others.  
A third attractive feature of EVM is that the standard errors will automatically be 
valid since the IV procedure uses realized bailouts, not the predicted ones, when 
computing the standard errors. If the SM is used instead, the standard errors typically 
need to be corrected, as discussed by Pagan (1984) and Murphy and Topel (1985). 
2.3 The subordinate organization’s information set 
The key question now is to determine what factors are relevant for the formation of 
bailout expectations (i.e., Iit-1) since those will function as instruments in the EVM 
method.
6 As was noted in the introduction, interpreting the SBC problem as a dynamic 
commitment problem suggests that we could construct instruments using information 
about previous bailouts since they should contain information about the superior 
organization’s ability to dynamically commit.  
                                                 
6 We can use any variable dated at t-1, provided that it is actually used by the subordinate organization 
when forming bailout expectations, as instruments since the rational expectations hypothesis rules out the 
possibility of any relationship between the prediction error vit and the organization’s information set Iit-1   7
Logically, there are two ways that previous bailouts could affect the expectations 
for bailouts, namely either by previous own experience of receiving bailouts or by 
observing that other subordinate organizations receive bailouts.
7 To take both channels 
into account in the estimation of the effect of bailout expectations on fiscal behavior, we 
re-specify the bailout expectations by replacing the term 
e
it B α  in equation (1) with the 
following expression: 
(3)   




p B B α α + , 
where
) ( p e
it B   is the expectations for bailouts based only on past own experience, and 
) (c e
it B is the expectation for bailouts based on observing bailouts of other organizations. In 
other words, the parameter α
p should be interpreted as the effect of expectations on fiscal 
behavior as originating from private incentives, that is, from a purely private calculus of 
decision making ignoring the effects from other organizations, whereas the parameter α
c 
would be interpreted as the effect of expectations on fiscal behavior due to bailouts of 
other organizations while holding private incentives fixed.  
We need to explicitly measure how previous bailouts affect bailout expectations. 
The simplest approach is to assume that expectations are formed based only on 
information about bailouts in period t-1. Thus, the instrument for own previous bailouts 
would then be defined as an indicator variable taking the value 1 if subordinate 
organization i was bailed out in period t-1, and zero otherwise (Bi,t-1).  
To construct an instrument for the expectation for bailouts as caused by bailouts 
of other subordinate organizations, we also need to define how subordinates form 
reference groups, i.e., to define the particular group that has an impact on the formation 
of bailout expectations for a specific subordinate organization. In the SBC, it seems 
                                                 
7 Kornai et al. (2003) argue that expectations of bailouts have much to do with “collective experience” 
since “[t]he more frequently financial problems elicit support in some part of the economy, the more 
organizations in that part of the economy will count on getting support themselves.” This type of 
explanation is related to the literature about externalities, group effects, neighboring effects, also known as 
social interactions effects (see, e.g., Brock and Durlauf, 2001, and the references cited therein). The goal of 
this literature is to provide explanations of group behavior, which emerges from interdependencies across 
agents, where the notion of agents embraces persons, firms and other entities such as nonprofit 
organizations and governments. These interdependencies or social interactions across agents can be 
modeled in a number of different ways. In the most general set-up, the actions, preferences, expectations, 
and constraints of one agent are permitted to affect the actions, preferences, expectations, and constraints of 
another agent.   8
reasonable to use a geographical definition of reference group since this capture the idea 
that geographical neighbors belong to the same media market and that they therefore 
have good information about whether neighbors have received a bailout or not.
8 Thus, we 
will assume that expectations of bailouts in period t depend on the average number of 
bailouts received by its geographical neighbors in period t-1,







where J is the number of geographical neighbors and Bjt-1 is an indicator variable with 
value 1 if neighbor j received a bailout in period t-1, zero otherwise.  
2.4 Estimation  
To identify the effects on fiscal behavior from the two channels of bailout expectations 
separately, we could use the method of indirect least squares.
10 We would then estimate 
two reduced forms: one OLS regression of debt on the two instruments and other 
exogenous covariates, and another OLS regression of realized bailouts on the same set of 
instruments and exogenous covariates. More formally, the two estimating equations in 
the indirect least squares method are 
(4)   Bit = π0 + π1Bi,t-1 + π 2 1   , − t J B + Xitβ + XJtδ + εit 
(5)   Sit = θ0 + θ1Bi,t-1+ θ2 1   , − t J B  + Xitθ + XJtϕ + ηit.                                          
                                                 
8 Besley and Case (1995), for example, use a geographical definition of reference group in their empirical 
analysis of social interaction effects in the form of tax competition between neighboring U.S. States.  
9 To understand why this particular source of variation is attractive for identifying group or social 
interaction effects in general, it is useful to approach the question of identification by asking whether there 
is any randomized trials of policy interventions that could in principle identify social interaction effects. 
This approach is discussed by Moffitt (2001), which suggests that one could identify social interaction 
effects by conducting partial-population experiments, whereby only a portion of the agents within each 
group is given treatment. In the present context of the SBC, the superior organization makes policy 
interventions by providing financial help to subordinate organizations. In other words, the source of 
variation used here, bailouts of geographical neighbors, is a non-experimental counterpart to the partial-
population experiment suggested by Mofitt. The explicit connection to randomized trials also helps in 
assessing whether a particular source of variation is likely to be exogenous. The identifying restriction 
implied by the partial-population experiment is that the fiscal behavior of a subordinate organization is not 
directly influenced by the bailouts of its neighbors. For example, this identifying restriction would be 
violated if geographical neighbors face similar shocks and we do not control for such effects in the 
empirical analysis since otherwise we might wrongly attribute behavioral significance to any correlation 
between a organization’s fiscal behavior and its expectations of being bailed out that is really due to 
correlated shocks across organizations. 
10 If we think that α
p= α
c, we could estimate the model via two-stage least squares to get more efficient 
estimates.   9
 where Xit is organization-specific covariates, and  XJt is group-specific covariates. 
Using the logic of indirect least squares, the parameters of equation (3) would be 
identified since  1 1 ˆ / ˆ π θ is an estimate of α
p and  2 2 ˆ / ˆ π θ  is an estimate of α
c. Here it is 
interesting to note that equation (5) may have a causal interpretation on its own if one is 
willing to assume that the subordinate organization formed its expectations through naïve 
instead of rational expectations. Thus,  1 ˆ θ  and 2 ˆ θ could directly be interpreted as estimates 
of α
p and α
c respectively in the case organizations have naïve expectations.  
The method of indirect least squares has however a drawback since it does not 
automatically produce standard errors. But there exist an alternative estimating procedure 
that will both give the estimates of α
p and α
c associated with the rational expectations 
hypothesis, as well as their standard errors. The procedure is basically an IV-method, 
where the first-stage would be the OLS regression on equation (4), but the second-stage 
regressions for the IV procedure will be different depending on the parameter of interest 
Here it is important to note that equation (4) does not necessarily have a causal 
interpretation since it is only a linear projection of an endogenous variable on instruments 
and other exogenous covariates. As discussed previously, one of the attractive features of 
using an IV method is that we do not need to consistently estimate the parameters of the 
first stage, which turns out to be quite useful here since this equation constitutes a 
dynamic nonlinear panel data model with unobserved heterogeneity.
11 
To isolate the independent effect from each instrument on debt we will include 
one of them as an additional regressor in the second stage of the two-stage least squares 
procedure. For example, in the case of isolating the independent effect of past experience 
on fiscal behavior (i.e., the parameter α
p), the second stage regression is given by  
(6)   Sit = δ it B ˆ + ω 1 − Jt B + Xitβ + XJtδ + εit, 
Now δˆ would be an estimate of α
p. The reason for including the other instrument, 1 − Jt B , 
as a regressor in the second stage is that we need to isolate the effect on fiscal behavior 
from expectations of bailouts that is only due to past own experience. The logic of this 
                                                 
11 As noted earlier, to construct consistent estimates of equation (4) is known to be notoriously difficult.   10
procedure can perhaps most easily be explained by referring back to equation (5), the 
reduced form regression of debt on the instruments. There we discussed that the direct 
effect of the instruments on debt may have a causal interpretation in the case that 
subordinate organizations have naïve expectations. Here, we are interested in estimating 
the parameters α
p and α
c when the rational expectations hypothesis is postulated instead. 
We must therefore hold the influence from the other channel of bailout expectations 
fixed. In order to do that we exclude the instrument associated with the effect of interest 
in the second stage regression, while allowing for the included instrument to have a direct 
effect on debt. This repeated IV approach is an alternative to the indirect least square 
method.  
To summarize, the empirical approach is to link a subordinate organization’s 
expectations for being bailed out to its fiscal behavior in order to quantify the extent of 
the bailout problem. We postulate that expectations for bailouts are formed rationally and 
make use of an instrumental variable method to get consistent estimates of the parameters 
of interest. We argue that past own experience of being bailed out and bailouts of other 
subordinate organizations can be used to construct credible instruments for the formation 
of bailout expectations. Next we turn to an empirical application of the approach. 
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3. Empirical application 
To be able to make use of our empirical approach of linking subordinate organizations’ 
expectations of bailouts to their fiscal behavior, it is necessary to have data on realized 
bailouts of these organizations, across organizations as well as over time. For this reason, 
we will apply our empirical approach of the SBC problem to the relationship between 
central and local governments in Sweden, where local governments (municipalities) 
recurrently received financial support from the central government over the period 1974-
1992. 
  Before turning to a description of the bailout program, it might be worth stressing 
that bailout of local governments is an interesting issue in its own right. During the last 
10-15 years there has been an increase in the number of sub-national governments with 
financial problems, both in the developed and in the developing world. In several of these 
instances, local governments received financial help, i.e., bailouts, from the central 
government.
12 Despite the fact that the violation of fiscal discipline at the local level is 
considered to be a serious economic problem, there have been few attempts to 
systematically evaluate the reasons for why sub-national governments end up in financial 
problems. Typically, the empirical work is based on case studies.
13   
3.1 The bailout program  
During the period 1974-1992, the central government was empowered by law (e.g. SFS 
1973:433, SFS 1979:362, and SFS 1988:491) to provide financial relief grants to local 
governments. In 1,697 cases the central provided financial support or bailouts to local 
governments. On average, these municipalities received SEK 166 per capita (with a 
standard deviation of 224).
14 
There are two features of the Swedish financial relief program that makes it 
attractive for studying the SBC problem. First, the relief program was not part of a 
regular intergovernmental transfer scheme that typically characterizes the fiscal 
arrangement between central/federal and sub-national units in most countries. Such 
                                                 
12 The perhaps best-known example is the bailout of the city of Sao Paolo in Brazil in the 1990s. 
13 See, e.g., the forthcoming books from the Inter-American Development Bank (edited by Fernandez-
Arias, von Hagen, and Stein, 2002) and from the World Bank (edited by Rodden and Eskeland, 2003). 
14 $1 dollar is roughly equal to SEK 6 (in 1991year prices).    12
transfer schemes are to a large extent heavily regulated or rule based. In contrast, this 
financial relief program was at the central governments discretion, and the central 
government had to make a new decision of the distribution of the relief grants each year. 
Second, the financial relief program was targeted explicitly to financially distressed 
municipalities. These particular attributes of the financial relief program facilitates an 
empirical investigation of the bailout problem since the program provided similar 
incentives as in the bailout problem: Municipalities can expect to be rescued from trouble 
and this can have a negative incentive effect on their budget discipline. 
The program was set up so that local governments could receive financial 
support in two different ways. The central government could distribute relief grants at its 
own initiative or the municipalities could apply directly to the central government. In 
either of these cases, the financial support from the central government was explicitly 
distributed to financially distressed municipalities. For those local governments that 
choose to apply for help, the application process was the following: The municipalities 
had to hand in their application before the end of March.
15 The central government then 
made its decisions during the fall the same year and the financial relief grants were 
finally paid out during the subsequent year. During each year, there were roughly 25 to 
60 of the applicants that received grants.
16 Typically, these municipalities claimed that 
they had severe financial problems and that they would be unable to fulfill their 
responsibilities without additional resources. Moreover, they also argued that their 
financial problems were due to external factors such as out-migration from the 
municipality, high unemployment rates, and, mainly as a consequence of the first two, a 
deteriorated tax base. In the case that the financial relief grants were distributed at the 
central governments initiative, the reasons for providing these additional grants were 
mainly based on compensating for adverse economic effects due to a change in the tax 
system and for reducing high income tax rates in certain municipalities.  
                                                 
15 This date applies to the period 1980-1992. For the year 1974, municipalities had to apply before June 
30
th, and for the period 1975-1979 they had to apply before January 31
st. 
16 We have information on the numbers of applicants for the financial relief grants for three years: In 1982, 
125 municipalities applied for, but only 51 received grants, in 1985, 123 municipalities applied for, but 
only 51 received grants, and in 1988, 119 municipalities applied for, but only 41 received grants.     13
In our data, however, we are unable to identify whether the financial relief 
grants were distributed at central governments initiative or via the local governments’ 
application process. Therefore, we are forced to treat the whole financial relief program 
as being informative about the bailout problem. However, we do think that this is the 
correct procedure in any case since it is the expectations of local governments of being 
rescued in case they should go into trouble that constitute the core of the bailout problem 
and therefore all the fiscal transfers from this program should contain valuable 
information about such expectations. 
Figures 1-3 describe our bailout data in greater detail. Figure 1 shows the 
amount of money (in MSEK at fixed 1991 prices) that was distributed annually during 
the period 1974 to 1992.  On average, the central government distributed MSEK 282 each 
year. Figure 1 also reveals quite large fluctuations in the annual sum (the standard 
deviation is 127), which reinforces the discretionary feature of the program. Figure 2 
shows the number of local governments receiving bailouts on an annual basis. There is a 
quite a large variation in the number of recipients, the average number being 90, with a 
minimum of 28 and a maximum of 173.  
As discussed in section 2, we are interested in the effect of both past own experience 
and bailouts of other local governments on fiscal behavior. One way of describing the 
variation that will be used to identify past experience is to create a frequency distribution, 
i.e., histogram, of bailouts across municipalities. Figure 3 shows the frequency 
distribution of bailouts based on information from the total number of bailouts each 
municipality has received over the period 1974-1992. This figure reveals a large variation 
in the number of bailouts across municipalities. For example, 3 municipalities 
(approximately 1 percent of the whole sample) received the maximum number of bailouts 
(19) whereas 23 municipalities (approximately 8 percent of the total sample) did not 
receive any bailouts at all. The average number of bailouts during the period is 6, which 
also roughly corresponds to the median number of bailouts.  
In the case of measuring the effect of bailouts of other local governments on fiscal 
behavior, we assume that a municipality form use geographical neighbors as the 
reference group when forming its bailout expectations. The Swedish municipalities have,   14
on average, 4.95 neighbors; the minimum is zero (1 municipality, the island of Gotland, 
has no neighbors; 7 municipalities have only one neighbor), and the maximum is 10 (1 
municipality has 10 neighbors). The reference group received on average 1.6 bailouts, but 
the variation is large (the standard deviation is 1.8).  
3.2 Measure of fiscal distress  
As measure of fiscal distress, we will use the level of local government debt, measured in 
per capita terms and at constant prices.
17 Since Swedish local governments have no 
restrictions on borrowing and do not meet any balanced budget rules, debt seems to be a 
suitable measure of fiscal discipline. There are several measures of debt in the official 
financial position of municipalities but we have chosen to work with short- and long-term 
debt, not including social security liabilities.
18 We made this choice so as to have a 
comparable measure of debt in the sample period, but also because the social security 
liabilities probably are not a good measure of fiscal misbehavior. Figure 4 provides 
information on how the average level of debt per capita has evolved during the period 
1974 to 1992. Figure 4 also provides information about the variation, i.e., a one standard 
deviation bound, and the minimum and the maximum values. The figure shows that the 
average debt decreased slightly until 1987, but slowly increased thereafter. However, the 
basic message is that the average level of debt has more or less been constant, but there is 
large variation across municipalities. 
3.3 Econometric considerations 
When taking the model defined in equations (4) and (5) to the data, it is important to deal 
with confounding effects such as heterogeneity and correlated shocks in the econometric 
specification in order for the expectations for bailouts to be causally related to local 
government behavior. 
This is not the least important when it comes to own past experience of bailouts, 
since any differences in observed fiscal behavior could also simply reflect some 
unobserved heterogeneity across local governments, and that this heterogeneity also is 
                                                 
17 We have used the implicit GDP deflator, expressed in 1991 values. The deflator is constructed by taking 
the ratio of GDP at current market prices to GDP at fixed market prices.   
18 Long-term debts are defined as debts with a maturity of 1 year or longer, while short-term debts have a 
maturity of up to 1 year. Data on social security liabilities are only available from 1988.   15
responsible for the variation in observed bailouts. For example, there may be correlated 
shocks across time that could induce a positive correlation between measures of fiscal 
distress and previous bailouts. There could also be local government specific 
characteristics that could produce such a correlation. In other words, we need to control 
for observable shocks and unobserved heterogeneity in order to identify whether past 
experience of bailouts have a causal effect on local government fiscal behavior.  
To control for unobserved heterogeneity we include fixed locality and time 
specific effects. The fixed locality effects will pick up any unobserved and unchanging 
characteristics of a local government that are both related to its fiscal behavior and the 
variables describing the formation of expectations. The time specific effects will pick up 
any unobserved macro effects that affect all local governments in the same way. There 
may also be idiosyncratic shocks that could induce spurious correlation between the 
instruments and Sit in equation (1). To control for such shocks, we include time varying 
local specific measures of the tax base, the unemployment rate, the age structure, the 
population size, and the population density. Some of these variables, such as population 
density and age structure, are also meant to capture the cost of providing public 
services.
19   
In the case of isolating the effect on fiscal behavior from bailouts of other local 
governments, we must also control for unobserved heterogeneity.
20 Since the reference 
group is fixed, and since we control for fixed municipality effects, any unobserved time 
invariant characteristics of the municipality’s reference group will not be part of the 
identification of the neighboring effect. We will also include reference group 
(geographical neighbors) characteristics, i.e., group means of the set of covariates 
described above. These reference group specific characteristics thus controls for 
observerable correlated shocks within reference groups. 
A final issue in the context of a panel data model with rational expectations is 
whether the instruments can be considered as strictly exogenous or if they are only 
                                                 
19 Table 1 provides summary statistics of the variables used in the data analysis. All the data was obtained 
from Statistics Sweden or its publications. 
20 See Manski (1993) for a discussion of identification of social interaction effects.   16
sequentially exogenous.
21 This concern has to do with whether one should use a fixed-
effect (FE) transformation or a first-difference (FD) transformation to remove the fixed 
municipality effect µi. This issue would be of no importance if the number of time 
periods T is very large since then either of the transformations would give consistent 
estimates. If T is small, however, and the instruments are only sequentially exogenous, 
the FE estimator would produce biased estimates whereas the FD estimator would still 
yield consistent estimates. Therefore, we will use both the FE estimator and the FD 
estimator.  
3.4 Institutional background 
Before we present the results, we digress briefly on the workings of Swedish local 
governments. Sweden is currently divided into 290 local governments (or municipalities), 
which cover the entire country. Local governments play an important role in the Swedish 
economy, both in terms of the allocation of functions among different levels of 
government and economic significance. They are, for example, responsible for the 
provision of day care, education, care of the elderly, and social welfare services. To 
quantify their economic importance, note that in the 1980s and 1990s their share of 
spending out of GDP was in the range of 20 to 25 percent and they employed roughly 20 
percent of the total Swedish workforce. Swedish local governments also have a large 
degree of autonomy. They have the constitutional right of self-government, they have no 
restrictions on borrowing, the state plays no part in either monitoring or approving local 
government accounts, and they have no balanced budget rules.
22 Moreover, during the 
period of investigation (1974-1992), the bulk of revenues were raised trough a 
proportional income tax, which each municipality was allowed to set freely,
23 and only 
20 percent of the total revenues came from intergovernmental grants.  
 
 
                                                 
21 See Lahiri (1993) or Wooldridge (2002, chapter 11) for a discussion of the assumptions for the IV 
approach to be valid in the context of panel data. 
22 As from year 2000 there is a balanced budget rule.  
23 From 1991 to 1993, however, the central government imposed a temporary tax cap.    17
4. Results 
In this section we present the results for the SBC problem, that is, to what extent local 
governments’ expectations for bailouts affect their debt behavior. As discussed in section 
2, our empirical approach is to assume that expectations for bailouts are formed rationally 
and to use ex-post realized bailouts as a proxy of the unobserved expectation for bailouts. 
This approach implies that we have an errors-in-variable problem, which necessitates the 
use of an instrumental variable approach in order to give consistent estimates of the effect 
of the unobserved expectation variable. The two instruments that we argued could have 
an affect on the formation of bailout expectations is past experience, measured as an 
indicator variable defining whether a municipality was bailed out or not in the previous 
period, and bailouts of other municipalities, measured as the average number of bailouts 
received by a municipality’s geographical neighbors in the previous period. We start by 
presenting the baseline results, which is then followed by a sensitivity analysis. 
4.1 Baseline results 
Before turning to the estimates of the causal parameter of interest, i.e., the effect of local 
governments’ expectations for bailouts on debt behavior, we begin by presenting the 
reduced form estimates, i.e., estimates obtained from the estimation of equations (4) and 
(5). 
Reduced form estimates 
 The results from the reduced form estimations are presented in Table 2. The first three 
columns show the reduced form estimates of the instruments on realized bailouts, while 
the last three columns show the reduced form estimates of the instruments on debt. We 
will also control for other variables that could induce a spurious relation between debt 
and the expectations for bailouts. In the most parsimonious specification, model I, we 
only include time- and municipality specific fixed effects. Model II includes all the other 
municipality specific covariates except municipal unemployment together with the means 
of the geographical neighbors’ covariates. Model III also adds the unemployment rate to 
the set of controls.
24 The first two rows show that both instruments have a positive and 
                                                 
24 The reason for excluding the unemployment variable in model II is that it is only available for the shorter 
period 1979 to 1992.   18
significant association with realized bailouts in all three specifications. From both the t-
statistics and the F-statistics of the partial F-tests presented in Table 2, it is clear that we 
can strongly reject the null hypotheses that the two instruments are either individually or 
jointly zero. Thus, we do not seem to suffer from the problem of weak instruments.
25  
The specifications presented in the last three columns of Table 2 are the reduced 
form OLS regressions of debt on the instruments. Both past own experience and bailouts 
of neighbors are significantly associated with an increase in debt. As noted above, this 
reduced form can have a causal interpretation if local governments use naïve expectations 
when forming their expectation of bailouts. Therefore, we can interpret the point 
estimates as the effect on debt of going from a zero probability to the probability of one 
of being bailed out. Thus, the effect from past own experience of bailouts is in the range 
of SEK 240-330 per capita, which is roughly 2-3 percent of the average debt (the average 
debt is SEK 10,218 per capita). The effect from bailouts of geographical neighbors is in 
the order of SEK 500-1,250 per capita, which constitute approximately 5-13 percent of 
average debt. However, if local governments have rational expectations, these estimates 
will be biased toward zero since these variables will effectively be proxies of the true 
bailout expectation. Here we can use the logic of indirect least square to get the consistent 
estimates. For example, taking the estimate of past experience of bailouts from Model 1 
in column 4 (i.e., 329) and dividing it with the estimate from column 1 (i.e., 0.356), we 
will get the rational expectation estimate from past experience, which is SEK 924 per 
capita. A similar calculation for the effect from bailouts of neighbors on debt gives SEK 
6,890 per capita. The estimates from Models II and III are 695 and 1,009 for past own 
experience, and 4,123 and 3,603 for bailouts of neighbors. The problem with the indirect 
least square method is that it does not automatically give standard errors. Therefore we 
now turn to the repeated instrumental variable method discussed in section 2. 
                                                 
25 The reduced form estimates of the instruments on the endogenous variable, i.e., the first stage regression 
in the IV approach, provide information about the relevance of the instruments. Staiger and Stock (1997) 
suggest using the F-statistic for the joint significance of the instruments in the first stage equation as a 
diagnostic of the power of the instruments. They argue that if the F-statistic is larger than 10, there should 
be no problem associated with weak instruments.   19
Instrumental variable estimates 
Table 3 shows the structural estimates of the effect of the municipalities’ expectations for 
bailouts on the municipalities’ debt behavior. The result in each cell in the table is the 
outcome of a separate instrumental variable regression. The covariates used, but not 
reported, in each regression corresponds to those for models I-III in Table 2. We present 
the separate effects of past own experience of bailouts and bailouts of geographical 
neighbors on debt. This is technically done by excluding one instrument at the time while 
holding the other instrument fixed, as discussed in section 2.4 (c.f. equations (4) and (6) 
for the case of isolating the independent effect of past experience on debt).  
The first row in Table 3 shows the independent effect of past experience of 
bailouts, whereas the second row shows the independent effect of bailouts of 
geographical neighbors. The estimates of past experience are statistically significant in all 
three specifications. The point estimates indicate that a municipality that has a probability 
of one of being bailed out increases its debt with approximately SEK 700-1,000 per 
capita compared to if the probability is zero, which corresponds to 6-10 percent of 
average debt. Turning to geographical neighbors, the estimated effect is also significant 
in all specifications and the corresponding effect on the debt varies between SEK 3,600-
6,900 per capita, i.e., 10-20 percent of the average debt. Table 3 also reveals that the size 
of the effect from neighbors is consistently larger, roughly four times larger or more, than 
the effect from past experience.  
So far we have used a fixed effect transformation of the data, but if the strict 
exogeneity assumption fails, then the within, or fixed effect (FE), transformation to 
remove the fixed effect is problematic unless the number of time periods (T) is large, as 
discussed in section 3.3. Under a FD transformation, the instruments must be lagged at 
least twice to be valid.
26 Thus, the cost of the FD instead of the FE transformation is that 
we loose more information in the data, implying that we will end up with less precise 
point estimates. The FD estimates are presented in Table 4, which should be compared to 
the corresponding estimates in Table 3. Those two tables reveal quite similar estimates 
across the two IV estimators, but, as expected, the FD estimates are less precisely 
                                                 
26 This IV-estimator is similar to the one proposed by Anderson and Hsiao (1982) in a dynamic panel data 
context.    20
measured. The large degree of similarity of the estimates across the two IV methods is 
also an indication of the instruments being strictly exogenous (Hausman, 1978).  
4.2 Sensitivity analysis 
In order to investigate how sensitive the results obtained in the last section are to changes 
in the model specifications, we will in this section examine some alternative 
specifications of the baseline model.  
In the baseline specification, we assumed that the expectations were formed based 
only on information in t-1.  However, it is likely that information further back in time, 
such as period t-2 or t-3, also counts in the formation of expectations. To test the 
sensitivity to this, we re-estimated the baseline model with other lag structures on the 
instruments. These results, presented in Table 5, should be compared to the baseline 
estimates in Tables 3 and 4 (to facilitate comparisons, the first row in each panel simply 
restate the results obtained in Tables 3 and 4).  
The first panel in Table 5 shows the effect of past experiences of bailouts on debt. 
It turns out that the estimates from the specifications of all three models are very stable 
when adding more lags of the instruments, which is true for both the fixed effects and the 
first differenced estimations. Furthermore, the estimates obtained when the identifying 
variation comes from past bailouts of neighboring municipalities, presented in the second 
panel, are also very similar to the baseline specification. Thus, it seems like our results 
are robust to changes in the lag structure of the instruments. 
So far we have assumed that the effects on debt from the two channels of bailout 
expectations are different, and we used an iterated instrumental variable method. 
However, if these effects are similar (i.e., α
p= α
c in equation (3)) we could instead use a 
traditional two-stage least squares (2SLS) method to estimate a single parameter, and 
thus getting a more efficient estimate. Table 6 shows the 2SLS estimates for all three 
specifications and for both the FE and FD transformations of the data. As is clear from 
the table, the estimated effect of a municipality’s expectations of being bailed out on its 
debt is both statistically significant and economically sizeable.   21
5. Summary and concluding remarks 
In this paper, we develop an empirical approach for investigating soft budget constraints. 
The approach is to link a subordinate organization’s expectations for being bailed out to 
its fiscal behavior in order to quantify the extent of the bailout problem. We postulate that 
expectations for bailouts are formed rationally and make use of an instrumental variable 
method to get consistent estimates of the parameters of interest. We argue that past own 
experience of being bailed out and bailouts of other subordinate organizations can be 
used to construct credible instruments for the formation of bailout expectations. The use 
of these instruments can be motivated from theoretical models stressing the link between 
soft budget constraints and dynamic commitment. 
We apply the empirical approach of the soft budget constraint problem to the 
relationship between central and local governments in Sweden, where local governments 
(municipalities) recurrently received financial support from the central government over 
the period 1974-1992. We assume that a municipality bases its expectation on own past 
experience of bailouts and bailouts of its geographical neighbors, and use this 
information to construct instrumental variables. The use of an instrumental variable 
approach implies that we do not have to correctly specify all the information used by 
municipalities when forming expectations. The only requirement is that they actually do 
use past own experience and bailouts of neighbors to form bailout expectations.  
The main finding is that the SBC problem exists and is sizeable; the estimates of 
past own experience indicate that a local government that has a probability of one of 
being bailed out increases its debt with approximately SEK 700-1,000 per capita 
compared to if the a probability is zero, which corresponds to 6-10 percent of average 
debt. However, the estimate of the effect on debt from bailouts of its geographical 
neighbors is at least four times as large as the effect from past own experience.  
We also made a number of robustness checks on the sensitivity of our results to 
changes in the information set, i.e., to different lag structures of the instruments, and to 
changes in estimation method. The baseline results were very robust to these alterations. 
In the estimations, we have also tried to control for unobserved heterogeneity, observable 
municipality specific shocks, and observable shocks within reference groups, that could   22
induce a spurious correlation between the fiscal behavior and the expectations for 
bailouts. The results are robust to these considerations.  
In the empirical approach, we also assumed that municipalities possess rational 
expectations. However, as a byproduct of our empirical approach, the reduced form 
estimates of the two instruments on debt imply a naïve model of expectations formation. 
These results are qualitatively similar to the ones from the rational expectations 
specifications. Despite this fact, we do think that rational expectations are a more 
reasonable approximation of how municipalities actually form expectations, not the least 
since they are economically significant organizations run by professional policymakers 
with the help of a sizeable bureaucracy. Nevertheless, it is still reassuring that our 
findings are robust to the assumptions of how municipalities process their information. 
  Finally, it can be noted that there are certain aspects of the bailout problem that 
we have not touched upon in this paper. One such thing is the motive for the central 
government in providing bailouts. As mentioned earlier, the econometric strategy that we 
have used do not allow for a causal interpretation of the first-stage estimations, i.e., the 
estimations where we have the bailout indicator as the dependent variable. This implies 
that we cannot infer anything about the reasons for the central governments to provide 
bailouts. It could for example be interesting to examine the role of politics in a central 
government’s decision to provide bailouts.
27 To that end, we must however make use of a 
different empirical strategy.  
 
                                                 
27 That politics might matter when a central government distributes money that it has large discretion over 
has been shown in Dahlberg and Johansson (2002).   23
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Table 1. Summary statistics 
  Mean St.  Dev  Min
a Max 
Debt 10,218  4,808  797  38,024 




.318 .466  0  1 
Bailouts of 
neighbors 
.316 .335  0  1 
Municipality’s 
characteristics 
     
Income 71,413  11,852  15,944  162,962 
Proportion of 
young, 0-15 
21.2 2.9  12.6  36.7 
Proportion of 
old, 65+ 
17.5 4.3  3.3 27.7 
Population size  29,699  52,403  2,924  681,318 
Population 
density 
113 367  0.3  3638 
Unemployment 2.64  1.62  .19  12.23 
Neighbors’ 
characteristics 
     
Income 71,527  10,783  0  123,192 
Proportion of 
young, 0-15 
21.0 2.4  0 32.0 
Proportion of 
old, 65+ 
17.5 3.5  0 25.2 
Population size  36,670  35,864  0  261,185 
Population 
density 
116 290  0 2432 
Unemployment 2.64  1.41  0  9.94 
a One municipality, the island of Gotland, has no neighbors.   26
Table 2. Reduced form estimates 
  Bailouts Debt 
  Model I  Model II  Model III  Model I  Model II  Model III 
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   -5.184 
(3.19) 
   -623   
(0.04) 
          
Fixed  effects  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time  effects  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R
2  0.54  0.54  0.56 0.65 0.67 0.71 
Relevance of the 
instruments 
F = 385  F = 317  F = 198       
Number  of  obs. 5048  5048  3944 5048 5048 3944 
Note: The dependent variables are the indicator for receiving a bailout or not in period t (the first three 
columns) and the level of municipality debt (the last three columns). Figures within parentheses are t-
statistics (absolute values). Robust standard errors were used in calculating t-statistics.    27
 
 
Table 3.The SBC problem: IV estimates using a fixed effect transformation 
  Model I  Model II  Model III 






      






      
Number of observations  5,048 5,048  3,944 
Note: The dependent variable is the municipalities’ debt. Figures within parentheses are t-statistics 
(absolute values). Robust standard errors were used in calculating t-statistics. The results in each cell are 
the outcome of separate regressions. The covariates used, but not reported, in each regression corresponds 
to those for columns I-III in Table 1. The instruments are own experience of bailouts and bailouts of 
neighbours, i.e., an indicator variable of whether a municipality was bailed out or not in period t-1, and the 




Table 4. The SBC problem: IV estimates using a first differencing transformation 
  Model I  Model II  Model III 






      






      
Number of observations  4,763 4,763  3,657 
Note: The dependent variable is the municipalities’ debt. Figures within parentheses are t-statistics 
(absolute values). Robust standard errors were used in calculating t-statistics. The results in each cell are 
the outcome of separate regressions. The control variables used, but not reported, in each regression 
corresponds to those for columns I-III in Table 1. A first differencing transformation of the data is used to 
remove the fixed effect and the instruments are an indicator variable of whether a municipality was bailed 
out or not in the period t-2, and the average number of bailouts received by its geographical neighbours in 
period t-2.      28
 




Model I  Model II  Model III 
  Own experience of bailouts 
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  Bailouts of neighbors 
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Note: The dependent variable is the municipalities’ debt. Figures within parentheses are t-statistics 
(absolute values). Robust standard errors were used in calculating t-statistics. The result in each cell is the 
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Table 6. Effect of both own experience and bailouts of neighbors: 2SLS estimates 
 
  Model I 
 
Model II  Model III 
  FE FD FE  FD  FE  FD 












Number of observations  5,048 4,763 5,048  4,763  3,944  3,657 
Note: The dependent variable is the municipalities’ debt. Figures within parentheses are t-statistics 
(absolute values). Robust standard errors were used in calculating t-statistics. The result in each cell is the 
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